Month: September 2009

Twitter gem – undefined method `stringify_keys’

Have you been getting the following errors when running the Twitter gem lately ?


/usr/local/lib/ruby/gems/1.8/gems/httparty-0.4.3/lib/httparty/response.rb:15:in `send': undefined method `stringify_keys' for # (NoMethodError)
from /usr/local/lib/ruby/gems/1.8/gems/httparty-0.4.3/lib/httparty/response.rb:15:in `method_missing'
from /usr/local/lib/ruby/gems/1.8/gems/mash-0.0.3/lib/mash.rb:131:in `deep_update'
from /usr/local/lib/ruby/gems/1.8/gems/mash-0.0.3/lib/mash.rb:50:in `initialize'
from /usr/local/lib/ruby/gems/1.8/gems/twitter-0.6.13/lib/twitter/search.rb:101:in `new'
from /usr/local/lib/ruby/gems/1.8/gems/twitter-0.6.13/lib/twitter/search.rb:101:in `fetch'
from test.rb:26

It’s because Twitter has been sending back plain text errors that are treated as a string instead of json and can’t be properly ‘Mashed’ by the Twitter gem. Also check http://github.com/jnunemaker/twitter/issues#issue/6.

Without diving into the bowels of the Twitter gem or HTTParty, you could ‘begin…rescue’ this error and try again in 5 minutes. I fixed it by overriding the offending code to return nil and checking for a nil response as follows:

[sourcecode language=’ruby’]
module Twitter
class Search
def fetch(force=false)

if @fetch.nil? || force
query = @query.dup
query[:q] = query[:q].join(‘ ‘)
query[:format] = ‘json’ #This line is the hack and whole reason we’re monkey-patching at all.

response = self.class.get(‘http://search.twitter.com/search’, :query => query, :format => :json)

#Our patch: response should be a Hash. If it isnt, return nil.
return nil if response.class != Hash

@fetch = Mash.new(response)
end

@fetch
end

end
end

[/sourcecode]

(adapted from http://github.com/jnunemaker/twitter/issues#issue/9)

If you have a better solution: speak up!

WordPress hack might affect more than your WordPress installation!

Just a quick note…

If you’re managing WordPress installations, and haven’t heard about the recent WordPress hacks (http://wordpress.org/support/topic/307660) yet you probably just got back from holiday.

There’s plenty of advice on fixing a hacked installation if you follow some of the links in the above post, so I’m not going to recite that here.

However! While cleaning a WordPress installation that resides in a subdirectory of a modx cms I found that the modx index.php files were also infected. I searched for infected files using grep as follows:

grep -R 'function gpc_' *

If you’re on a shared hosting environment that doesn’t allow shell access: time to change your hosting provider. (mail me if you need recommendations)